Against Knowledge Closure

Knowledge closure is the claim that if an agent S knows P recognizes that P implies Q and believes Q because it is implied by P then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure Marc Alspector-Kelly''s critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is instead intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape including skepticism warrant transmission and transmission failure fallibilism sensitivity safety evidentialism reliabilism contextualism entitlement circularity and bootstrapping justification and justification closure. As a result the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects.