An Agency Theory View of the Military Advisor

<p>An understanding of civil-military relations provides insight for the military strategist into the interplay between politics and military art. A framework of how civilian leadership and the military relate in formulating national security objectives may prove useful in developing military strategies. In Armed Servants: Agency Oversight and Civil-Military Relations political scientist Peter Feaver proposes a theory of civil-military relations based on principal-agent theory called Agency theory which defines civil-military relations as the day-to-day strategic interaction between civilian leaders and the military. According to Agency theory the civilians set oversight measures to monitor the behavior of the military and the military responds based on the probability of its behavior being discovered and its expectation of punishment from civilian leadership.</p><p>This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore you will see the original copyright references library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world) and other notations in the work.</p><p>This work is in the public domain in the United States of America and possibly other nations. Within the United States you may freely copy and distribute this work as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.</p><p>As a reproduction of a historical artifact this work may contain missing or blurred pages poor pictures errant marks etc. Scholars believe and we concur that this work is important enough to be preserved reproduced and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.</p>