Between Saying and Doing

Between Saying and Doing aims to reconcile pragmatism (in both its classical American and its Wittgensteinian forms) with analytic philosophy. It investigates the relations between the meaning of linguistic expressions and their use. Giving due weight both to what one has to do in order to count as saying various things and to what one needs to say in order to specify those doings makes it possible to shed new light on the relations between semantics (the theory of the meanings `f utterances and the contents of thoughts) and pragmatics (the theory of the functional relations among meaningful or contentful items). Among the vocabularies whose interrelated use and meaning are considered are: logical indexical modal normative and intentional vocabulary. As the argument proceeds new ways of thinking about the classic analytic core programs of empiricism naturalism and functionalism are offered as well as novel insights about the ideas of artificial intelligence the nature of logic and intentional relations between subjects and objects.