Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan Germany and the United States

<p>Why did financial keiretsu develop in Japan, but not in Germany and the United States? Why is bank intermediation more dominant in Germany and Japan than in the United States? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each system?<br><em>Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany and the United States</em> answers these and related questions. Helmut Dietl explains capital market intermediation, holding companies, multidivisional organizations, financial keiretsu, and LBO associations as organizational responses to capital market inefficiencies. Country-specific responses are described as a consequence of country-specific financial regulations. Each regulatory regime results in specific capital market inefficiencies. Comparative capital market and corporate data highlight the major strengths and weaknesses of each system. This book provides a comprehensive and innovative analysis of German, Japanese and U.S. regulations.</p> Introduction 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Investment relation, Investment relation costs, Relevant dimensions of investment relations, Classification of alternative regulatory environments, Organizational modes of capital allocation and corporate governance, Discriminating match 2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES Germany, Japan, United States, Conclusion, SUMMARY