Democracy Bureaucracy and Public Choice

First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors’ research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life. <ol> <li>Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis <br>DEMOCRACY </li> <li>Interest Groups and Collective Action </li> <li>Reconstructing the Theory of Groups </li> <li>Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour </li> <li>Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model <br>BUREAUCRACY </li> <li>Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy </li> <li>The Bureau-Shaping Model </li> <li>Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models </li> <li>Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science</li> </ol>