Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society (2) the structure of political institutions (3) the nature of political and economic crises (4) the level of economic inequality (5) the structure of the economy and (6) the form and extent of globalization. Review 'This path-breaking book is among the most ambitious innovative sweeping and rigorous scholarly efforts in comparative political economy and political development. It offers a broad substantial new account of the creation and consolidation of democracy. Why is the franchise extended? How do elites make reform believable and avoid expropriation? Why do revolutions nevertheless occur? Why do new democracies sometimes collapse into coups and repression? When is repression abandoned? Backed by a unified analytic model historical insight and extensive statistical analysis the authors' case is compelling.' James E. Alt Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government Harvard University'This tour de force combines brilliant theoretical imagination and historical breadth to shine new light on issues that have long been central in social science. The book cannot be ignored by anybody wanting to link political and economic development. Its range is truly impressive. The same logical framework offers plausible predictions about revolution repression democratization and coups. The book refreshingly includes as much Latin American experience as European experience and as much Asian as North American. The authors offer new intellectual life to economics political science sociology and history. Game theory gains a wider audience by being repeatedly applied to major historical issues for which commitment is indeed a key mechanism. Economists and political scientists gain more common ground on their political economy frontier.' Peter Lindert University of California Davis'Acemoglu and Robinson have developed a coherent and flexible analytical framework that brings together many aspects of the comparative political economy of democratization and democratic consolidation. Beyond being an excellent work of synthesis this framework also leads to insights that will pave the way for further theoretical and empirical investigation. The combination of theory and historical application make this a first-rate book for teaching as well as a major research contribution.' Thomas Romer Princeton University'This book is an immense achievement. Acemoglu and Robinson at once extend the frontiers of both economics and political science; they provide a new way of understanding why some countries are rich and some are poor; and they reinterpret the last 500 years of history.' Barry Weingast Stanford University'A vast body of research in social science on the development of democracy offers detailed accounts of specific country events but few general lessons. Acemoglu and Robinson breathe new life into this field. Relying on a sequence of formal but parsimonious game-theoretic models and on penetrating historical analysis they provide a common understanding of the diverse country histories observed during the last two centuries' Torsten Persson Director Institute for International Economics Studies Stockhol