Feeling Pain and Being in Pain Second Edition

<b>An examination of the two most radical dissociation syndromes of the human pain experience--pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain--and what they reveal about the complex nature of pain and its sensory cognitive and behavioral components.</b><p>In <i>Feeling Pain and Being</i> in Pain Nikola Grahek examines two of the most radical dissociation syndromes to be found in human pain experience: pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain. Grahek shows that these two syndromes--the complete dissociation of the sensory dimension of pain from its affective cognitive and behavioral components and its opposite the dissociation of pain's affective components from its sensory-discriminative components (inconceivable to most of us but documented by ample clinical evidence)--have much to teach us about the true nature and structure of human pain experience.</p><p>Grahek explains the crucial distinction between<i> </i>feeling pain and being in pain defending it on both conceptual and empirical grounds. He argues that the two dissociative syndromes reveal the complexity of the human pain experience: its major components the role they play in overall pain experience the way they work together and the basic neural structures and mechanisms that subserve them.</p><p><i>Feeling Pain and Being in Pain</i> does not offer another philosophical theory of pain that conclusively supports or definitively refutes either subjectivist or objectivist assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Instead Grahek calls for a less doctrinaire and more balanced approach to the study of mind-brain phenomena.</p>