Games and Human Behavior

<p>Human behavior often violates the predictions of rational choice theory. This realization has caused many social psychologists and experimental economists to attempt to develop an experimentally-based variant of game theory as an alternative descriptive model. The impetus for this book is the interest in the development of such a theory that combines elements from both disciplines and appeals to both. <br><br> The editors have brought together leading researchers in the fields of experimental economics, behavioral game theory, and social dilemmas to engage in constructive dialogue across disciplinary boundaries. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the new insights into the motivation of human behavior under a variety of naturally or artificially induced incentive structures that are emerging from their work. Amnon Rapoport--a pioneer and leader in experimental study and quantitative modeling of human decisions in social and interactive contexts--is honored.</p> <p><b>Contents: D. Budescu, I. Erev, R. Zwick,</b> Preface. <b>Part I:</b><i>On Psychology and Economics.</i><b>R. Zwick, I. Erev, D. Budescu,</b> The Psychological and Economical Perspective on Human Decisions in Social and Interactive Contexts. <b>R.M. Dawes,</b> Experimental Demand, Clear Incentives, Both, or Neither? <b>Part II:</b><i>Learning in Experimental Games.</i><b>C. Camerer, T-H. Ho,</b> Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: Estimates From Weak-Link Games. <b>I. Erev, A.E. Roth,</b> On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The Cognitive Game-Theoretic Approach. <b>R. Selten, J. Buchta,</b> Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions With Directly Observed Bid Functions. <b>Part III:</b><i>Market and Coordination Games.</i><b>R. Nagel,</b> A Survey on Experimental Beauty Context Games: Bounded Rationality and Learning. <b>J. Ochs,</b> Coordination in Market Entry Games. <b>D.A. Seale, J.A. Sundali,</b> Cheap Talk in a Large Group Coordination Game. <b>Part IV:</b><i>Bargaining, Fairness, and Equity.</i><b>G.E. Bolton,</b> Strong and Weak Equity Effects--Evidence, Significance, and Origins. <b>W. Güth,</b> On the Effects of the Pricing Rule in Auction and Fair Division Games--An Experimental Study. <b>E. Weg, R. Zwick,</b> Infinite Horizon Bargaining Games: Theory and Experiments. <b>Part V:</b><i>Social Dilemmas and Coordination.</i><b>H. Goren, G. Bornstein,</b> Reciprocation and Learning in the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma Game. <b>S.S. Komorita, C.D. Parks,</b> Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Review and Future Directions. <b>W.B.G. Liebrand, D.M. Messick,</b> Dynamic and Static Theories of Costs and Benefits of Cooperation. <b>C. Snijders, G. Keren,</b> Determinants of Trust. <b>R. Suleiman, D.V. Budescu,</b> Common Pool Resource (CPR) Dilemmas With Incomplete Information.</p>