Increase in Nuclear Capabilities of Pakistan: Implications for India

Pakistan sees India as the raison d’etre for going nuclear and considers its nuclear weap-on as the ultimate guarantor of nation’s existence and its sovereign entity providing for strategic equaliser of power asymmetry deterrent of conventional war and facilitator of sub-conventional war. It was in May 1998 when both India and Pakistan openly went nuclear. However since then the way Pakistan has been amassing fissile materials and developing nuclear arse-nal including development of TNW and their envisioned employment as weapon of warfighting is a matter of concern for the world as a whole and India in particular. India’s nuclear doctrine has never been reviewed since its introduction in January 2003. With increase in Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities impacting security considerations for In-dia there is a raging debate with respect to India’s doctrine of NFU and Massive Retalia-tion. So the debates making round are—Is there a need for India to review its Nuclear Doctrine? Does Pakistan’s TNW pose dangers to robustness of nuclear deterrence be-tween India and Pakistan? Has Pakistan blocked the options for India to launch conven-tional operations and achieved its envisaged full spectrum deterrence? Is Pakistan’s TNW Threat Credible? What is the Efficacy/Futility of TNW as Weapon of Warfighting? Should India also develop TNW? and Should India sign CTBT?The author has attempted to answer these questions and has been remarkably frank and honest in expressing his views.