Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I

<p>This volume examines how the Ottoman Army was able to evolve and maintain a high level of overall combat effectiveness despite the primitive nature of the Ottoman State during the First World War. </p><p>Structured around four case studies, at the operational and tactical level, of campaigns involving the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire: Gallipoli in 1915, Kut in 1916, Third Gaza-Beersheba in 1917, and Megiddo in 1918. For each of these campaigns, particular emphasis is placed on examining specific elements of combat effectiveness and how they affected that particular battle.</p><p>The prevalent historiography attributes Ottoman battlefield success primarily to external factors - such as the presence of German generals and staff officers; climate, weather and terrain that adversely affected allied operations; allied bumbling and amateurish operations; and inadequate allied intelligence. By contrast, Edward J. Erickson argues that the Ottoman Army was successful due to internal factors, such as its organizational architecture, a hardened cadre of experienced combat leaders, its ability to organize itself for combat, and its application of the German style of war.</p><p><em>Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I</em> will be of great interest to students of the First World War, military history and strategic studies in general.</p> Introduction1. From the Ashes of Disaster2. Gallipoli – 19153. Kut Al Amara – 19164. Gaza-Beersheba – 19175. Meggido – 19186. The Strength of an Army.Appendices.Selected Bibliography.Index