Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I

<p>This volume examines how the Ottoman Army was able to evolve and maintain a high level of overall combat effectiveness despite the primitive nature of the Ottoman State during the First World War. </p><p>Structured around four case studies at the operational and tactical level of campaigns involving the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire: Gallipoli in 1915 Kut in 1916 Third Gaza-Beersheba in 1917 and Megiddo in 1918. For each of these campaigns particular emphasis is placed on examining specific elements of combat effectiveness and how they affected that particular battle.</p><p>The prevalent historiography attributes Ottoman battlefield success primarily to external factors - such as the presence of German generals and staff officers; climate weather and terrain that adversely affected allied operations; allied bumbling and amateurish operations; and inadequate allied intelligence. By contrast Edward J. Erickson argues that the Ottoman Army was successful due to internal factors such as its organizational architecture a hardened cadre of experienced combat leaders its ability to organize itself for combat and its application of the German style of war.</p><p><em>Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I</em> will be of great interest to students of the First World War military history and strategic studies in general.</p>