Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong

First published in 2002. This is Volume VI of twelve in the Library of Philosophy series on Ethics. Written in 1971, this text looks at our knowledge of right and wrong and looks at topics of whether our knowledge of morality is a delusion and asks questions around moral judgment and they are subjective, the Universalization principle of a moral sense, God's commandments and human duties and finishes with suggestions of other reasons for actions. Chapter I First-Order/Second-Order; Chapter II Is Knowledge of Morality a Delusion?; Chapter III Some Preliminary Distinctions; Chapter IV Moral Judgments As a Priori and Analytic: The Place of Demonstrative Reasoning in Ethics; Chapter V Moral Judgments as a priori and Synthetic: Intuitionism and the Naturalistic Fallacy; Chapter VI Moral Judgments as Synthetic, Contingent and Empirical: Subjectivism; Chapter VII Ideal Observer Theories; Chapter VIII Moral Sense Theories; The Universalization Principle; Chapter IX God’s Commands and Man’s Duties; Chapter X Morality and Moral Codes; Chapter XI Evolution and Ethics; Chapter XII Non-Propositional Theories; Chapter XIII Moral Judgment and Some Practical Uses of Language; Chapter XIV To Be or Not To Be; Chapter XV Some Other Moral Judgments; Chapter XVI Reasons for Action;