Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics

In the <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i> Aristotle suggests that a moral principle 'does not immediately appear to the man who has been corrupted by pleasure or pain'. <i>Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics</i> investigates his claim and its reception in ancient and medieval Aristotelian traditions including Arabic Greek Hebrew and Latin.<br/><br/>While contemporary commentators on the <i>Ethics</i> have overlooked Aristotle's remark his ancient and medieval interpreters made substantial contributions towards a clarification of the claim's meaning and relevance. Even when the hazards of transmission have left no explicit comments on this particular passage as is the case in the Arabic tradition medieval responders still offer valuable interpretations of <i>phantasia</i>(appearance) and its role in ethical deliberation and action. This volume casts light on these readings showing how the distant voices from the medieval Arabic Greek Hebrew and Latin Aristotelian traditions still contribute to contemporary debate concerning <i>phantasia</i> motivation and deliberation in Aristotle's <i>Ethics</i>.