Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings

<p><em>Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings</em> is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics:</p><ul> <p> </p> <li>subjective probability and credence</li> <p> </p> <li>probability updating: conditionalization and reflection</li> <p> </p> <li>Bayesian confirmation theory</li> <p> </p> <li>classical, logical, and evidential probability</li> <p> </p> <li>frequentism</li> <p> </p> <li>physical probability: propensities and objective chances.</li> </ul><p>The book features a useful primer on the mathematics of probability, and each section includes an introduction by the editor, as well as a guide to further reading. A broad-ranging and highly accessible exploration of the subject, <em>Philosophy of Probability</em> is ideal for any student of formal epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics, or philosophy of mathematics.</p> <p>Probability Primer <strong>Part 1: Degrees of Belief </strong>1. Introduction 2.Truth and Probability, <em>F. P. Ramsey </em>3. Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections and Problems, <em>Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. </em>4. A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism, <em>James Joyce </em><strong>Part 2: Updating Degrees of Belief: Conditionalization and Reflection </strong>5. Introduction 6. Why Conditionalize?, <em>David Lewis </em>7. Probability Kinematics, <em>Richard C. Jeffrey </em>8. Belief and the Will, <em>Bas C. van Fraassen </em>9. Diachronic Rationality, <em>Patrick Maher </em>10. Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem, <em>Adam Elga </em>11. Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection, <em>Frank Arntzenius </em>12. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments, <em>Darren Bradley</em> & <em>Hannes Leitgeb </em><strong>Part 3: Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory </strong>13. Introduction 14. Bayesian Versus non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation, <em>Colin Howson </em>&<em> Peter Urbach </em>15. Why I am not a Bayesian, <em>Clark Glymour </em>16. Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support, <em>Ellery Eells </em>& <em>Branden Fitelson </em><strong>Part 4: Evidence and Probability: Evidential Probability and Principles of Indifference </strong>17. Introduction 18. Indifference: the Symmetries of Probability, <em>Bas C. van Fraassen </em>19. Statistical and Inductive Probability, <em>Rudolf Carnap </em>20. Is The Theory of Logical Probability Groundless?,<em> D. C. Stove </em><strong>Part 5: Physical Probability: The Frequency Theory </strong>21. Introduction 22. The Definition of Probability, <em>Richard von Mises </em>23. Mises Redux, <em>Richard C. Jeffrey </em>24. Mises Redux -Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism, <em>Alan Hájek </em>25. Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism, <em>Alan Hájek </em><strong>Part 6: Physical Probability: Objective Chance and Propensities </strong>26. Introduction 27. A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance, <em>David Lewis </em>28. A Propensity Interpretation of Probability, <em>Karl Popper </em>29. Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics, <em>Ronald N. Giere </em>30. Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities, <em>Paul W. Humphreys </em>31. David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance, <em>Barry Loewer </em>32. Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity, <em>Brian Skyrms </em><strong>Bibliography </strong><strong>Index</strong></p>