Post-Election Violence in Africa

<p>This book explores the effect of the judiciary on the incidence of post-election violence by political actors across Africa and within African countries. It examines how variation in judicial independence can constrain or incentivize election violence among democratizing states.</p><p>Using case studies and cross-national analysis the book shows that variation in levels of judicial independence from a non-independent judiciary to a quasi-independent judiciary or from a fully independent judiciary to quasi-independent judiciary increases the likelihood of strategic use of post-election violence by non-state actors. However the likelihood of post-election violence is significantly reduced in non-independent judiciaries or once countries’ judiciaries become fully independent. The author makes the theoretical argument that within unconsolidated states non-state actors that view the judiciary as semi-independent are more likely to engage in post-election violence with the purpose of creating political and professional uncertainty in order to influence assertive behaviour from judges in disputed elections. Consequently the book argues that semi-independent judiciaries or judiciaries that are neither fully controlled by the incumbent nor fully independent from the incumbent can help explain post-election violence among unconsolidated states all else being equal. </p><p>This book will be of interest to scholars of election violence democratic politics law and politics and African politics.</p>