Problems of epistemology in a Wittgensteinian context

The book is a collection of articles on epistemology in the context of Wittgensteinian normative pragmatism/naturalism. In particular the problem of the definition of knowledge the Getye problem the problem of the value of knowledge the concepts of knowledge-as and phenomenal knowledge are analyzed anti-random epistemology Sandi Goldberg's approach based on the notion of epistemically admissible propositions Ernest Sosa's epistemology of epistemic capacities Duncan Pritchard's anti-random epistemology of epistemic capacities and his Bayesian approach to the problem of skepticism Timothy Williamson's first-knowledge epistemology are discussed. First-knowledge-epistemology is favored and it is argued that it is compatible with the Wittgensteinian approach to knowledge. A definition of knowledge as a true (implicitly or explicitly) justified opinion is proposed provided that the epistemic gap between justification and veridical explanandum is closed within an appropriate language game.