Recent Advances in Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games

<p>The articles in this volume collectively represent the latest advances in how<br />people think of social dilemma problems how we may be able to enhance cooperation<br />and reduce free-riding in such problems and how we can extend the lessons learned<br />to a host of other similar issues facing us. We have learned for instance that a “take”<br />frame does not necessarily lead to lower cooperation compared to a “give” frame<br />but combining a “take” frame with fine-grained individual level feedback leads to<br />more extreme behavior in terms of both greater cooperation and greater free-riding.<br />We have also learned that a strategy based on payoff sampling may provide a more<br />parsimonious and less parameter dependent way of modelling behavior in common<br />pool resource extraction games. We find that people behave differently in social<br />dilemmas when making decisions of their own as opposed to deciding on behalf of<br />someone else.</p>