Role of Initiative in Soviet Operational Command

<p>This monograph examines the role of initiative in Soviet operational level command. It seeks to answer the question: Do Soviet operational commanders have the personal initiative and latitude to react to unexpected or changed situations on their own responsibility? This question is prompted by a real perception that Soviet commanders tend to be rigid and inflexible due to over centralized command and control. If this perception is correct the Soviet Army may be unable to react rapidly to changing situations. If it is false Western military doctrine and planning may be based on false assumptions. This paper begins by defining the terms of the discussion. It defines the concept of personal initiative as it relates to military command. The paper points out that there is a common view that the Soviet concept is more restrictive than the U.S. concept but concludes that there is really much in common. The paper also defines doctrine as it is used in the discussion. The paper then examines Soviet operational initiative through World War II. This begins with a brief discussion of the pre-war doctrinal basis. Then three operational level commanders are examined. The first commander General M. M. Popov did not display significant individual initiative during his February 1943 operations. The next commander discussed General Pavel Rotmistrov commanded a tank army during and after the Battle of Kursk in mid-1943. Rotmistrov showed considerable initiative and moral courage. He provides an important example of the increasing ability of the Soviet Army to tolerate initiative. The final commander examined is Marshal Koniev who showed extremely strong initiative and courage in developing his plan of operations for the Lvov-Sandomierz operation in July to August 1944. This section concludes with a discussion of the changes in Soviet doctrine during World War II that strengthened the importance of initiative. Next the monograph discusses the changes that have impacted on the i</p><p>This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore you will see the original copyright references library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world) and other notations in the work.</p><p>This work is in the public domain in the United States of America and possibly other nations. Within the United States you may freely copy and distribute this work as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.</p><p>As a reproduction of a historical artifact this work may contain missing or blurred pages poor pictures errant marks etc. Scholars believe and we concur that this work is important enough to be preserved reproduced and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.</p>