Substantialism and Relationalism

Behind the main currents in philosophy and social science there is a rigid and overlapping canon of philosophical assumptions: substantialism. Its influence is such that it ranges from mechanistic social theories to those of social constructivism subjectivism collectivism or individualism in general. They all believe in a social thing. The present work suggests analyzing these assumptions at a meta-ontological philosophical level that is as assumptions that operate and direct ontological definitions without the need to establish any specific definition. It is argued that substantialism establishes meta-physical maxims of a normative character that require defining the social as a class with clearly defined limits self-sufficient identity and its own causality that is as a closed metaphysical structure. In contrast the book explores the metaphysical maxims of the antagonistic meta-ontological current: Relationalism or processualism and its open metaphysical structure. Towards the end the question remains about the validity of the category social opening also the question about the natural and the great categories of modern science.