Taking Morality Seriously

In <em>Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism</em> David Enoch develops argues for and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This view--according to which there are perfectly objective universal moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other natural truths--is familiar but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns defensive--defending Robust Realism against traditional objections--it mobilizes the original positive arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections.<br>The main underlying motivation for Robust Realism developed in the book is that no other metaethical view can vindicate our taking morality seriously. The positive arguments developed here--the argument from the deliberative indispensability of normative truths and the argument from the moral implications of metaethical objectivity (or its absence)--are thus arguments for Robust Realism that are sensitive to the underlying pre-theoretical motivations for the view.