Terrorism Deterrence and Nuclear Weapons

<p>This paper delves into the enduring principles of deterrence policy as they apply to Radical Islamists and their state sponsors. It concludes that the current stockpile is ineffective and unsuitable for deterring transnational Radical Islamist organizations and their state sponsors. It suggests that the US has been effectively self-deterred by imposing unnecessary limitations throughout the Nuclear Security Enterprise making it less responsive and unfit for 21st century realities. US will is perceived to have declined to the point that capabilities are being affected. A vision of a future nuclear arsenal better equipped to deal with the threat is offered the threat itself defined and suggestions are made to enhance the robustness of the nuclear enterprise and enable it to respond effectively to future threats.</p><p>This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore you will see the original copyright references library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world) and other notations in the work.</p><p>This work is in the public domain in the United States of America and possibly other nations. Within the United States you may freely copy and distribute this work as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.</p><p>As a reproduction of a historical artifact this work may contain missing or blurred pages poor pictures errant marks etc. Scholars believe and we concur that this work is important enough to be preserved reproduced and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.</p>