The Fact of Reason

What does it mean to act freely? In other words: Howcan we - practically and epistemologically - specifythe ability that rational beings have to make thingshappen in the world in a way that warrants that theybe held responsible? This book suggests a renewedapproach to this question with the purpose ofavoiding dualistic consequences.Kant tries to solve the free will problem bydefending the possibility of a metaphysical space forfreedom outside the realm of nature. Despite itssubtleties his theory remains dualistic. In thisbook the problem is approached from a differentangle: Rather than starting out (negatively) with anexamination of the metaphysical possibility oftranscendental freedom it is argued (positively)that freedom is an analytical component of theconcept of action. If we start with the way weactually recognise (our own and others') actions asfree we come to see that it is not a matter ofidentifying and describing an inner quality but amatter of mutual recognition and acknowledgement.