Metaphysics of Contingency

<p>Philosophers approach the problem of possibility in two markedly different ways: with reference to worlds whereby an event is possible if there is a world in which it occurs and with reference to modal properties whereby an event is a possible manifestation of a property of some substance or object. <p/>Showing how the world-account cannot properly explain the nature of possibilities within worlds Ferenc Huoranszki argues that the latter approach is more plausible. He develops a theory of contingent possibilities grounded in a distinction between abilities and dispositions as real first-order modal properties of objects with fundamentally distinct ontological roles. <p/>By understanding abilities as first-order modal properties and by linking such modal properties to counterfactual conditionals Huoranszki argues we can distinguish between variably generic or specific abilities and identify more or less abstract possibilities <i>in </i>a world. In doing so he furthers our understanding of how we reason with possibilities in both ordinary and theoretical contexts. Providing a novel account of dispositions abilities and their capacity to explain modality this book advances current debates in contemporary metaphysics.</p>