The Military Maxims

Military Maxims of NapoleonThis page is devoted to the military maxims of Napoleon.ContentsMaxim I. The frontiers of states are either large rivers or chains of mountains or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next and broad rivers occupy the third place.Maxim II. In forming the plan of a campaign it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to circumstances -- the genius of the general the character of the troops and the topography of the theater of action.Maxim III. An army which undertakes the conquest of a country has its two wings resting either upon neutral territories or upon great natural obstacles such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some cases that only one wing is so supported and in others that both are exposed.Maxim IV. When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies which have each their separate line of operation until they arrive at a point fixed upon for their concentration it should be laid down as a principle that the union of these different corps should never take place near the enemy: because the enemy in uniting his forces may not only prevent this junction but may beat the armies in detail.Maxim V. All wars should be governed by certain priniciples for every war should have a definite object and be conducted according to the rules of art. (A war should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome.)Maxim VI. At the commencement of a campaign to advance or not to advance is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has been assumed it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skillful the maneuvers in a retreat it will always weaken the morale of an army because in losing the chances of success these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides retreats always cost more men and materiel than the most bloody engagements; with this difference that in a battle the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own--whereas in a retreat the loss is on your side only.