Nature of Things

<p>Originally published in 1973. In this systematic treatise Anthony Quinton examines the concept of substance a philosophical refinement of the everyday notion of a thing. Four distinct but not unconnected problems about substance are identified: what accounts for the individuality of a thing; what confers identity on a thing; what is the relation between a thing and its appearances; and what kind of thing is fundamental in the sense that its existence is logically independent of that of any other kind of thing? In Part 1 the first two problems are discussed while in Part 2 the third and fourth are considered. Part 3 examines four kinds of thing that have been commonly held to be in some way non-material: abstract entities; the un-observable entities of scientific theory; minds and their states; and finally values. The author argues that theoretical entities and mental states are in fact material. He gives a linguistic account of universals and necessary truths and advances a naturalistic theory of value.</p>