Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds

<p>While philosophers have been interested in animals since ancient times, in the last few decades the subject of animal minds has emerged as a major topic in philosophy. <i>The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds</i> is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, problems, and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising nearly fifty chapters by a team of international contributors, the <i>Handbook</i> is divided into eight parts:</p><ul> <p> </p> <li>Mental representation</li> <li>Reasoning and metacognition</li> <li>Consciousness </li> <li>Mindreading</li> <li>Communication</li> <li>Social cognition and culture</li> <li>Association, simplicity, and modeling</li> <li>Ethics.</li> </ul><p>Within these sections, central issues, debates, and problems are examined, including: whether and how animals represent and reason about the world; how animal cognition differs from human cognition; whether animals are conscious; whether animals represent their own mental states or those of others; how animals communicate; the extent to which animals have cultures; how to choose among competing models and explanations of animal behavior; and whether animals are moral agents and/or moral patients. </p><p>The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, ethics, and related disciplines such as ethology, biology, psychology, linguistics, and anthropology.</p> <p>Introduction, <i>Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck</i></p><p>Part I: Mental representation</p><p>1. Arthropod intentionality? <i>Andrew Knoll and Georges Rey</i></p><p>2. Visual imagery in the thought of monkeys and apes <i>Christopher Gauker</i></p><p>3. Maps in the head? <i>Michael Rescorla</i></p><p>4. Do nonhuman animals have a language of thought? <i>Jacob Beck</i></p><p>5. Animal minds in time: the question of episodic memory <i>Christoph Hoerl and Teresa McCormack</i></p><p>6. Novel colours in animal perception <i>Mohan Matthen</i></p><p>7. Color manipulation and comparative color: they’re not all compatible <i>Derek H. Brown</i></p><p>Part II: Reasoning and metacognition</p><p>8. Animal rationality and belief <i>Hans-Johann Glock</i></p><p>9. Instrumental reasoning in nonhuman animals <i>Elisabeth Camp and Eli Shupe</i></p><p>10. A different kind of mind? <i>Matthew Boyle</i></p><p>11. Can non-linguistic animals think about thinking? <i>José Luis Bermúdez</i></p><p>12. On psychological explanations and self-concepts (in some animals) <i>Eric Saidel</i></p><p>13. Non-human metacognition <i>Joëlle Proust</i></p><p>Part III: Consciousness</p><p>14. So that’s what it’s like! <i>Sean Allen-Hermanson</i></p><p>15. Do fish have feelings? <i>Michael Tye</i></p><p>16. The unpleasantness of pain for nonhuman animals <i>Adam Shriver</i></p><p>17. Attention, working memory, and animal consciousness <i>Jesse Prinz</i></p><p>18. Animal consciousness and higher-order thoughts. <i>Rocco Gennaro</i></p><p>19. Minds and bodies in animal evolution <i>Michael Trestman</i></p><p>20. The evolution of consciousness in phylogenetic context <i>Peter Godfrey-Smith</i></p><p>Part IV: Mindreading</p><p>21. Animal mindreading: the problem and how it can be solved <i>Robert Lurz</i></p><p>22. What apes know about seeing <i>Marta Halina</i></p><p>23. Using causal models to think about mindreading <i>Hayley Clatterbuck</i></p><p>24. Do chimpanzees reason about belief ? <i>Kristin Andrews</i></p><p>25. Tracking and representing others’ mental states <i>Stephen A. Butterfill</i></p><p>26. From false beliefs to true interactions: are chimpanzees socially enactive? <i>Sarah Vincent and Shaun Gallagher</i></p><p>Part V: Communication</p><p>27. Pragmatic interpretation and signaler-receiver asymmetries in animal communication <i>Dorit Bar-On and Richard Moore</i></p><p>28. Communicative intentions, expressive communication, and origins of meaning <i>Dorit Bar-On</i></p><p>29. How much mentality is needed for meaning? <i>Mitchell S. Green</i></p><p>30. The content of animal signals <i>Ulrich Stegmann</i></p><p>31. Intentionality and flexibility in animal communication <i>Christine Sievers, Markus Wild, and Thibaud Gruber</i></p><p>Part VI: Social cognition and culture</p><p>32. What is animal culture? <i>Grant Ramsey</i></p><p>33. Varieties of culture <i>Grant Goodrich</i></p><p>34. Animal traditions: what they are, and why they matter <i>Rachael L. Brown</i></p><p>35. Primates are touched by your concern: touch, emotion, and social cognition in chimpanzees <i>Maria Botero</i></p><p>36. Do chimpanzees conform to social norms? <i>Laura Schlingloff and Richard Moore</i></p><p>37. Kinds of collective behavior and the possibility of group minds <i>Bryce Huebner</i></p><p>Part VI: Association, simplicity, and modeling</p><p>38. Associative learning <i>Colin Allen</i></p><p>39. Understanding associative and cognitive explanations in comparative psychology <i>Cameron Buckner</i></p><p>40. A new view of association and associative models <i>Michael Dacey</i></p><p>41. Simplicity and cognitive models: avoiding old mistakes in new experimental contexts <i>Irina Mikhalevich</i></p><p>42. Against Morgan’s Canon <i>Simon Fitzpatrick</i></p><p>43. A bridge too far? Inference and extrapolation from model organisms in neuroscience <i>David Michael Kaplan</i></p><p>Part VIII: Ethics</p><p>44. Animals and ethics, agents and patients <i>Dale Jamieson</i></p><p>45. Moral subjects <i>Mark Rowlands</i></p><p>46. Decisional authority and animal research subjects <i>Andrew Fenton</i></p><p>47. Empathy in mind <i>Lori Gruen</i></p><p>48. Using, owning, and exploiting animals <i>Alasdair Cochrane</i></p><p>49. Animal mind and animal ethics <i>Bernard Rollin.</i></p><p><em>Index</em></p>