Unreal Beliefs

<b>Krzysztof Poslajko offers a novel version of an anti-realist view about beliefs rejecting the extreme proposal of eliminativism that beliefs do not exist.</b>He shows us we should rather say that beliefs exist but they are not real. <br/><br/>Poslajko demonstrates how we might make sense of this idea by providing a unified account of the debates in philosophical psychology. The antirealist view interprets beliefs as being causally irrelevant that they do not constitute a natural kind and that their content cannot be naturalized. Exploring the status of folk psychology Poslajko raises key questions in the analytic metaphysics of mind: Are beliefs real? Do people really possess mental states which are causally efficacious bearers of propositional content? <br/><br/>By arguing for the antirealist view and revising our common-sense view about the nature of mind he makes a compelling case for adopting a pragmatic metaphilosophy when we deal with questions about belief.